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1	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK	
2	LASILKN DISTRICT OF NEW TORK	
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4	IME WATCHDOG INC.,	: 22-CV-1032(PKC)
5	Plaintiff	22-CV-1032(FRC)
6	-against-	
7	-aya mst-	United States Courthouse : Brooklyn, New York
8	SAFA ABDULRAHIM GELARDI,	December 6, 2022
9	Defendant.	: 3:00 p.m.
10		X
11	TRANSCRIPT OF ORAL ARGUMENT BEFORE THE HONORABLE PAMELA K. CHEN UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE	
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13	CHILD CHARGO DIGHTON CODGE	
14	APPEARANCES:	
15	For the Plaintiff:	MILMAN LABUDA LAW GROUP PLLC
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17	`	BY: EMANUEL KATAEV, ESQ.
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25	Proceedings recorded by mechanical stenography, transcript produced by computer-aided transcription.	

THE COURTROOM DEPUTY: Civil cause for a premotion conference. Docket 22-CV-1032. IME WatchDog, Inc. versus Gelardi, et al.

Will the parties please state their appearances for the record, starting with plaintiff.

MR. KATAEV: Good afternoon, everyone. My name is Emanuel Kataev of Milman Labuda Law Group, PLLC for the plaintiff.

THE COURT: Good afternoon, Mr. Kataev.

MR. SCHEUERMAN: Good afternoon, Your Honor.

Karl Scheuerman from Warner & Scheuerman for the defense.

THE COURT: Good afternoon, Mr. Scheuerman.

So we are here on the premotion conference request of defendants to file a motion to dismiss as to the amended complaint that was filed in October by the plaintiff in this case, IME WatchDog.

And I guess I want to just at the outset,
Mr. Kataev, remind you, because your papers are somewhat
unclear at times, that there is only one plaintiff in this
case, in that Ms. Levi is not a plaintiff. At various points
you refer to the plaintiff as a "she," for example, so
obviously that is an error. It is IME WatchDog that is the
plaintiff and then there are a number of defendants on the
other side, seven individuals now in one corporation in the

amended complaint.

But the reason I wanted to meet with the parties is because given my familiarity with this case, I have a serious concern that it is getting mired down in unduly acrimonious and wasteful litigation by both sides, quite frankly. I was concerned when the plaintiff filed the request for attorney's fees after only securing a preliminary injunction, which, to my mind, was premature and quite unusual. But now I am presented with this motion to dismiss request by the defense, which I think -- and I will explain why in detail -- is non-meritorious and I think would be extraordinarily wasteful to file.

And so let me turn everyone's attention to this proposed motion. Again, to set the record straight, the plaintiff here incorrectly says that Judge Cho allowed plaintiff to amend in this matter based on the merits of the motion to amend that the plaintiff had filed. That is incorrect. Judge Cho simply allowed plaintiff to amend because it was still within the period that plaintiff could do so as of right. So Judge Cho did not pass at all on or consider the merits of the motion to amend that was filed which are essentially being re-raised, effectively, in the motion to dismiss that now the defense wants to bring.

I would urge you, Mr. Scheuerman, not to file that motion to dismiss because I will summarily deny it, and I will

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tell you why. And I understand I cannot tell you not to file something, especially a motion, but I do want you to understand that there is no percentage in that motion. The arguments you want to make are either ones that I have already rejected in the context of the motion for fees that was filed before or otherwise.

So, first of all, you say that the plaintiff has failed to allege that any defendant made a defamatory statement which was of and concerning IME, which is the plaintiff corporation. You point out that Ms. Gelardi -- and for the court reporter's sake, if I refer to Ms. Gelardi, the spelling is G-e-l-a-r-d-i, first name Safa, S-a-f-a, and she is one of the defendants -- that her GoFundMe page did not actually name the lawsuit or the company, IME WatchDog. what is clearly incorrect about that and unavailing about that is, as is laid out in the amended complaint, the GoFundMe page is linked to Ms. Gelardi's Facebook page in which there are clear references to the precise lawsuit. In fact, there is someone who responds and pulls up the actual opinion that I issued relating to the preliminary injunction where I made findings that the defendants had actually stolen the information that they are alleged to have stolen, or at least that there was a strong likelihood of success on that based on the evidence presented to me. And then there is a specific identification of exactly the case, the business,

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IME WatchDog. So there is no doubt here that that is the business that is being defamed when you link the two together. And they are linked together by Ms. Gelardi herself. said in my prior decision, and I address specifically the request to file defamation claims at that time, I gave very specific warnings to Ms. Gelardi about what I would find would be per se defamation. I do not necessarily want to read the entire docket order into the record, but it is dated June 10, 2022. At that time, I specifically said what you are saying now, which is not correct, Mr. Scheuerman, that at that time, the statements that were being recited to me did not contain any identifying details about Levi or WatchDog, that Ms. Gelardi did not identify the kind of business she was in, the clients that she served, or other identifying information that would lead someone who knows Levi or WatchDog to conclude that the statements concern them. That is entirely different now because of the facts that have been brought out in the amended complaint, that Ms. Gelardi specifically linked her own Facebook page which expressly now identifies exactly the business, exactly the case, exactly the players involved: Ms. Levi and WatchDog. So the circumstances that I had previously found did not exist before and thus did not support the plaintiff's effort then to get contempt, actually, that was the context, for defamation, now exists. Or they always existed, but now those facts are being amended in this amended

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complaint. So my finding that that would constitute defamation per se governs here. It has basically been revived or brought to life by the new facts that have been discovered and now are alleged in the amended complaint.

So this addresses the second argument that you propose to make in your motion to dismiss, that there are no defamatory statements by Ms. Gelardi but rather they are subjective opinions posted on social media rather than assertions of facts capable of being proved false. I already rejected that argument before. These are the same statements about the business was doing so well, we caught up with our number-one competitor, the attorney is greedy and ruthless, et cetera, et cetera. Again, at the time, the only reason I did not find per se defamation against Levi and WatchDog was because they were not specifically identified. But again, that is all in the past because the facts now are clear that Ms. Gelardi did link Levi and WatchDog specifically to the defamatory statements. The ones that I said before were per se defamatory. And again, that is in the opinion that I wrote. I specifically said neither does the Court agree that Safa Gelardi's statements are mere opinions. Had they identified WatchDog or Levi in any manner, they would have been defamatory per se. So I have already rejected that second argument that you proposed to me because I reviewed those same exact statements and found them defamatory, but

they had not yet, or at least I was unaware that they had been connected to Levi and WatchDog.

And then the third argument that you propose to make is that the plaintiff has failed to plead special damages and therefore the amended complaint is defective. That is just wrong as a matter of law based on my prior finding that the statements, that are not opinions but are actually defamatory statements, are per se defamatory, and in that situation you do not have to plead special damages. So the case of Thi versus Cayre Group Limited, 726 F. Supp 323, Southern District of New York, 2010 stands exactly for that proposition. Under New York law, a defamation claim must either constitute defamation per se or cause special damages. And so because I ruled that these statements, if connected to WatchDog or Levi, would be defamatory per se, then special damages do not need to be pled. So that would not be a valid basis for dismissing the amended complaint.

And then finally, the fourth basis upon which you want to move is your argument that there is no basis for liability against IME Companions, defendant company, because the plaintiff concedes that the statements in question had been made by Safa Gelardi rather than Companions. And so you argue that there is not enough of a connection between the statements made by Ms. Gelardi on her Facebook page and the Companions company, or I should say on the GoFundMe page. So

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I guess Ms. Gelardi made those on the GoFundMe page. But again, if you connect as Ms. Gelardi did, basically by linking her Facebook page to her GoFundMe page, if you connect those two, it is clear that the claims, or these defamatory statements rather, are being made against Levi and WatchDog because the case it specifically referenced talks about WatchDog and the statements say the business was doing so well. So she is clearly speaking on behalf of her company, IME Companions.

And actually, my focus in my prior sentence was The argument you want to make is that there is not enough of a connection between Gelardi and Companions in her making those statements. The plaintiff has responded that the icon or the logo for IME Companions appears on the Facebook page of Ms. Gelardi. That is certainly some evidence by which someone would link these statements, these defamatory statements to Companions, but probably in and of itself not enough because people can put all sorts of logos on their Facebook page. For example, if someone likes to drink Coke a lot, they can put Coke in their little bubble there or a picture of them drinking Coke, but that would not necessarily attribute all of their statements to The Coca-Cola Company. But here, the statements themselves combined with the IME logo indicates that that is exactly what she is talking about, her business. She says: The business was doing so well, we

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caught up with our number-one competitor. So clearly everyone in this area of business, and it is not a big world, would know exactly who Gelardi is talking for and who she is talking about, that she is talking about her company, IME Companions, and her number-one competitor, which is made clear by the linkage to the Facebook page, plaintiff's company, IME WatchDog.

So to me, this amended complaint sets forth a claim for per se defamation, at least based on the standard that applies here at a complaint stage, which is plausible inference. So I would find that your motion to dismiss, as you have proposed it, would not be successful, so I urge you not to file it. I, of course, cannot order you not to file it, but I do not want you wasting your time or your client's resources, nor the resources of the plaintiff and their attorney, or its attorney, to respond. And as you can tell, attorney's fees is a very -- it is a source of litigation in this case; it should not be at this time. But you might only just incur more potential claims for attorney's fees if you file this. So it is up to you, but I am giving you the benefit of my analysis. Because there is really not much more for me to look at other than the complaint and your arguments which you have set forth pretty clearly in your letters, in both of your letters.

So that is what I wanted to explain to you. I will

10 give you some time to think about what you want to do. 1 2 And I am happy to hear from either side if you would 3 like to be heard at this time. 4 MR. SCHEUERMAN: Yes, I do, Your Honor. THE COURT: Go ahead, Mr. Scheuerman. 5 MR. SCHEUERMAN: My problem here is, as you pointed 6 7 out in your first statements to plaintiff's counsel is, 8 there's a conflating here of the plaintiff and the plaintiff's 9 principal and they're not one and the same for the purposes of defamation law. And there's also -- and because of this 10 11 conflation, there's also an inherent contradiction in the 12 nature of the claim. The claim is that it's defamation per se 13 because it goes to the profession; i.e., lawyer, greedy 14 ruthless lawyer. That's the crux of the defamation claim, greedy ruthless lawyer. That's what makes it defamation 15 16 per se, correct? 17 THE COURT: Hang on. 18 That is abusing the law. That would suggest that 19 the business, along with the greedy, ruthless lawyer, are 20 abusing the law, right? To sue me out of business because she 21 has the means to do so. 22 MR. SCHEUERMAN: But in order to be defamation 23 The

MR. SCHEUERMAN: But in order to be defamation per se, it has to go to the profession of the plaintiff. The plaintiff is an IME watchdog that works for lawyers. The plaintiff's principal is a lawyer. The alleged defamatory

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statements allude to a lawyer and they allude to a female lawyer with the pronoun "she" and "her" scattered throughout the statements. They don't refer in any -- they don't in any way impugn upon the plaintiff itself ability to conduct its business, its performance and ability of the business, how it performs its business. It doesn't call IME WatchDog a corrupt company that can't be trusted to work for plaintiff's lawyers in personal jury cases, doesn't accuse them of any fraudulent conduct in their business or any dishonesty in the performance of its business. The only allegation that has a connection to a profession is to the individual, Ms. Levi, who is not the plaintiff in this case. So they're getting around what is happening here because plaintiff is getting around the special damages requirement by saying it's per se because you said greedy, ruthless lawyer. But the plaintiff isn't a lawyer. Now, if the plaintiff here was the Law Offices of Daniella Levi or, you know, Daniella Levi & Associates, then I wouldn't want to make the motion, but the plaintiff is IME WatchDog; IME WatchDog does not practice law. So I don't understand how a statement regarding to a -- referring to an attorney can be deemed defamation per se to a company that doesn't practice Because in order to be per se, it has to impugn that business's ability to perform its job, integrity in the performance of its job, and competence, fitness, et cetera. Nothing was said about IME WatchDog that they could not be

trusted by plaintiff's lawyers to be hired to serve as watchdogs on their behalf in personal jury cases. Nothing was said. The only allegations pertain directly to Ms. Levi, who is not a plaintiff in this case.

THE COURT: But how is it not disparaging the business to say that Levi and WatchDog, because WatchDog is the plaintiff, are simply suing them to run them out of business? I mean, an aggressive litigation strategy that she claims is based on false claims, how does that not disparage the company and falsely?

MR. SCHEUERMAN: But again, so that could serve as the basis for a defamation claim, but not defamation per se; because per se has to impugn the business of the plaintiff in the performance of its business, its integrity, its competence, its fitness, its qualifications. You can't say IME WatchDog are a bunch of criminals and crooks who don't show up for IMEs. You can't say that. But there's nothing wrong with referring to its principal, who is not a plaintiff, as a ruthless and greedy attorney.

THE COURT: But let me ask you a question. You are saying that accusing, which is how I read these statements when you put the two together, the two different pages together, but accusing IME WatchDog, the plaintiff, of bringing a purely frivolous lawsuit to bully her company into bankruptcy is not defamation of the company?

13 1 MR. SCHEUERMAN: No. 2 THE COURT: Because it is about the lawsuit being 3 brought against them based on false charges and being used to 4 simply run them out of business improperly. You are sort of 5 drawing this distinction between saying aggressive tactics such as that because they used the legal system versus the 6 7 delivery of the services they provide means that it cannot be 8 defamation per se. 9 MR. SCHEUERMAN: Yes. 10 THE COURT: What case stands for that proposition? 11 MR. SCHEUERMAN: Every case. 12 It has to impugn upon the quality of the work, the 13 integrity of the work, not the integrity of the individual who 14 heads the company. 15 No, no. But again --THE COURT: 16 MR. SCHEUERMAN: What they're doing here is they're 17 bootstrapping --18 THE COURT: No, no, no. Stop, stop, stop. 19 Please. 20 You keep focusing on Levi. I am saying to you, I 21 construe these statements, when read together, as accusing 22 WatchDog, the company, of pursuing an aggressive litigation 23 strategy. Because they are the only ones who are suing, 24 right? It is WatchDog, plaintiff, is suing her company, and

her, she would say based on false accusations simply to bully

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14 them out of business. And that is what your client, 1 2 Ms. Gelardi, is effectively saying. You keep recasting it as 3 her only accusing Levi of this because of the one statement 4 about a ruthless attorney. But the reality is, when you put all of this together, it is a law firm. I mean, sorry, it is 5 the company, WatchDog, that is the plaintiff. And so clearly 6 7 the company's reputation as an overly aggressive, unfairly 8 competing business is being disparaged. You cannot avoid that 9 conclusion. 10 MR. SCHEUERMAN: That has nothing to do with how it conducts its business. That's how it deals with its 11 12 competitors. 13 THE COURT: Right. You are saying that that cannot 14 form the basis of defamation per se? 15 MR. SCHEUERMAN: Correct. They're bootstrapping the 16 per se because the allegations at the lawyer. 17 THE COURT: So what case says that? That is what I 18 am asking you. 19 MR. SCHEUERMAN: Well, I haven't looked for an exact 20 case saying that, but the general law is, for it to be 21 defamation per se, it has to impugn to the plaintiff 22 dishonesty, misconduct, incapacity, unfitness, or lack of any 23 necessary qualification in the exercise of its business. 24 THE COURT: Wait. Wait.

MR. SCHEUERMAN: Suing competitors is not the

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exercise of its business. Attending IMEs for plaintiff's lawyers is the exercise of its business.

THE COURT: I am not sure I agree with you on that. Pursuing a litigation strategy where you sue somebody for stealing your trade secrets is certainly a function of the business. Going after competitors who you claim have stolen your secrets and doing it dishonestly is what she is alleging; we did not steal anything, yet they are suing us. How is that not still part of conducting their business?

MR. SCHEUERMAN: Because they aren't retained by plaintiff's lawyers to deal with their own competitors. They're retained by plaintiff's lawyers to attend physical examinations on behalf of personal injury plaintiffs. What they do with their competitors, how they deal competitors, how they deal with former employees, et cetera, has nothing to do with how they conduct their business. The defamation, to be per se, has to be with respect to the actual conduct of its business.

THE COURT: Well, let me just say this. You can keep repeating that.

MR. SCHEUERMAN: Okay.

THE COURT: But again, and this is -- I am looking at the letter written by Mr. Warner, your partner, the cases he cites focus on the individual versus the company, so Ms. Levi, attacking Ms. Levi versus her company. You do not

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cite me cases, and you are going to have to, to support this claim that somehow pursuing litigation, a company pursuing litigation against a competitor alleging theft of trade secrets is not part of its business, is not part of it running its business. You are focused solely on and, I do not know, if you are right, you are right, but nothing in your letter says to me you are right. You say you do not know any cases off the top of your head. Clearly the letter you wrote or your partner wrote or submitted does not suggest that that is the case. But you can bring your motion and make that argument. But I hope you understand that the other arguments you have made, although obviously if it is not defamation per se, then the failure to plead special damages could be an argument about the deficiency. But the other statements about linkage, I think there is enough to allege a linkage between your client speaking on behalf of IME Companions and also about what are defamatory statements, I believe, about the But you need to make your argument about that then company. when you make your motion and find case law that supports that.

It does not make sense to me that somehow the definition of conducting one's business is limited simply to the services that one provides or the products that one produces, but could include how they go about fending off competitors, like, you know, predatory pricing.

17 Let's suppose they were accused of predatory pricing 1 2 Would you say that that cannot be defamation? falselv. 3 MR. SCHEUERMAN: No, that, to me, is a type of 4 defamation per se. Improper billing, improper --5 But somehow suing --6 THE COURT: 7 MR. SCHEUERMAN: -- a poor product, incompetence, 8 unfitness, unqualified, that's what the general rule is. 9 have not located or looked for a case with this specific fact 10 pattern, and one may not be around. 11 But I just don't understand how something that's 12 done outside of the practice of the business is per se, 13 defamation per se to the -- pertaining to the conduct of the 14 business itself. She did not say anything which impugned upon 15 how they conduct their business on behalf of plaintiff's 16 lawyers. 17 THE COURT: Listen. Again, I would like to see the 18 case law. Because as a matter of common sense and factual 19 reality, I think the litigation strategy a company pursues 20 could be how they conduct their business. Because the 21 allegation -- I mean, I do not think an individual, for 22 purposes of defamation law, should be able to say, without a 23 basis in reality, that a company is suing them solely to put 24 them out of business because they are competing so well and

based completely on false allegations. I do not know how that

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cannot be a form of defamation per se, because it certainly relates to how the company conducts itself and it relates to the honesty of the company. You just read that statement a moment ago about honesty and how it conducts its business. Ι view litigation strategy or litigation it undertakes or anything related to the law -- let's say, for example, they have to file forms with the State Department of New York, which I assume is true, I do not think you can say that they did that illegally and get -- and if it is false, get away with not engaging in defamation. It certainly has to do with how they conduct their business, but it does not have to do with providing the actual services. You would have that definition so thinly and narrowly defined that it would exclude a lot of things that businesses do undertake in order to run their business. I do not know if you are right. If you find the case, I could be persuaded. But on the face of it, that strikes me as contrary to common sense in the way and the purpose of the law.

MR. SCHEUERMAN: Well, I will do some researching before we make a decision. I take Your Honor's words under advice.

THE COURT: Yes.

Let me also point out to you that the case law also says that a false statement constitutes defamation per se when it charges another with a serious crime or tends to injure

another in his or her trade, business or profession. And that comes from the case of *Geraci versus Probst*, 61 A.D.3d at 718. That is a New York Supreme Court case. And that, at least that statement, does not at all seem to cabin in or even make contingent on the business that is being conducted IN whether or not the alleged bad act related directly to the conduct of a company's business, but rather focused on the nature of the statement, the allegedly defamatory statement made by the maker and its impact on the allegedly defamed party. So regardless of whether or not it has to do with how their business was conducted, the question is: Did it injure his or her trade or business? I guess that in some ways could apply to Levi. But she is not the plaintiff here, so I guess that is --

MR. SCHEUERMAN: That's my problem here.

THE COURT: Well, no, that could be a limitation on that concept.

But again -- but again -- I do find there is enough of a connection to the statements your client made, which is basically about the business, WatchDog, because WatchDog is the plaintiff. And so if, in fact, bringing a lawsuit could be deemed as part of running one's business or if there really is not such a narrow construction of what the defamation has to relate to, I do not see a problem with WatchDog bringing the defamation claim based on the statements that were made.

30 days?

It is clear, to me at least, that the statements themselves are impugning what WatchDog is doing in terms of bringing the lawsuit, even though obviously it also is against Levi herself. And I will say this. Based on the links to the case itself, the fact that Ms. Levi is really, for all practical purposes, WatchDog, the company, I think draws a nexus between her and WatchDog, the plaintiff, much closer.

But you should brief your motion then, because I can hear that you are not dissuaded from doing so. You think you have a good argument. Like I said, I am giving you the benefit of my thoughts already. But I think as a matter of factual allegations, there is enough here to connect your client as making a statement on behalf of IME Companions and her statements going against or being about both Levi and WatchDog, because of the direct reference to the lawsuit and the players in the lawsuit and the plaintiff in the lawsuit, which is WatchDog. I also preliminarily disagree with you that that cannot be defamation per se as to WatchDog, but that is, I guess, going to be the point you are going to try to make in your motion.

How much time do you want to file your motion?

MR. SCHEUERMAN: Whatever the Court thinks is best.

THE COURT: I do not have any view. Do you want

MR. SCHEUERMAN: 30 days would be great, Your Honor.

21 1 THE COURT: Okay. 2 Also, you need to enter your appearance, I think, in 3 this matter. 4 MR. SCHEUERMAN: Yes. I was unaware. I operated on my partner's PACER account. 5 6 THE COURT: Okay. All right. 7 MR. KATAEV: Your Honor, may I address some of these 8 issues before we go to the schedule? 9 THE COURT: Yes. Go right ahead. 10 MR. KATAEV: Thank you. 11 So I imagine that because IME WatchDog Inc. is a 12 corporation duly formed under the laws of the State of 13 New York, that its certificate of incorporation probably says 14 -- I haven't seen it -- that it is authorized to perform any 15 lawful act in furtherance of its business. That's a statement 16 that's designed to explain the scope of its business. And if 17 it says something like that, which most certificates of 18 incorporation do, I would submit that any act that it takes, 19 including bringing litigation, is within the scope of its business. 20 It's not limited to solely scheduling IMEs and 21 having observers attend them and so on and so forth. 22 broadly speaking, anything and everything that it does 23 lawfully. And it is lawful to bring a lawsuit, and it did so. 24 So I would argue that and I share that with opposing counsel, 25 for him to consider that argument before deciding whether or

not defendants wish to pursue that motion.

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And I'm also confused about this it's-plaintiff-not-Levi and you're focusing on Levi and not plaintiff. I cited extensive case law on this subject, that courts have allowed claims where the statement did not identify the plaintiff but named an individual who was understood to represent the plaintiff. Mrs. Levi is the principal of the plaintiff. She formed the entity. She is the face of that company. In the complaint she talks about how extensively she worked to have all these law firms come to her to have these services performed. Because she's a personal injury attorney, when she was in court she would speak to her colleagues and talk about the business. That's how she built it up, from the ground up. So she is, in essence, the plaintiff. Any derogatory remark against her, setting aside the fact that she's an attorney, is against the plaintiff.

There is another case that I cite. The first case is *Daytree*. It's an Eastern District of New York decision from 2018. I didn't cite which judge. It says that a statement about a company -- it's the reverse here, I acknowledge that -- *Daytree* was of and concerning two individuals.

THE COURT: Can I stop you.

I do not think that is a discussion anymore. I

23 1 agree with you that the letter filed by Mr. -- what is your 2 partner's name? 3 MR. SCHEUERMAN: Warner. THE COURT: -- Mr. Warner focused on the individual 4 versus the company. 5 6 But the argument Mr. Scheuerman is making is 7 different. 8 MR. KATAEV: Okay. 9 THE COURT: He is saying you can only defame a 10 company by attacking how it provides its services, not by how 11 it carries out other aspects of its business, by filing 12 Because they are not in the business -- they are litigation. 13 not lawyers, for example, I guess is the argument -- you 14 cannot defame them for bringing a false lawsuit. That is what 15 he is arguing. And that is essentially what this -- that is 16 the thrust of the defaming statement, which is that they are 17 bringing a false lawsuit simply to drive us out of business. 18 So Mr. Scheuerman's more nuanced argument, but different than 19 what his partner argued, as one of the bases is that that 20 cannot be defamation as to a company that is not in the 21 business of suing people. 22 MR. KATAEV: Yes, but in fairness, he's making both 23 arguments, this argument that you just discussed and the other 24 one.

THE COURT: Well, I reject the argument that there

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is any daylight between Ms. Levi and the company because of some of the reasons that you said, but more because ultimately everything is linked back to the actual case and WatchDog is clearly the business and the business is referred to throughout this allegedly defaming statement. At the end it says: This is another example of big companies putting anyone who wants to compete with them out of business. So, clearly defaming WatchDog directly, regardless of Ms. Levy being the focus of the beginning part to some extent. But she is sort of the actor or the person who is, I would say, pushing the company, and it is clear, to do that. But there can be no mistake or doubt, I do not think, and it is certainly a reasonable inference, that the statement is actually defaming both WatchDog and Ms. Levi because it says this is what big companies do to put their competitors out of business.

Mr. Scheuerman, your only, and the only argument I really am interesting in looking at, because I have resolved everything else based on what I have seen, is, is there any case law to support the notion that you cannot defame a company for engaging in overly aggressive litigation, or something else, whatever it is, that is not at the core of the services they provide or the actual business, if you want to call it that, that they are in.

MR. SCHEUERMAN: If I may, Your Honor?

The question isn't whether it's defamatory, whether

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    it's defamatory per se. Because if not per se, they have to
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    plead special damages, and they only pled general damages
 3
    here.
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              That, to me, is the --
              THE COURT:
                          Okay.
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              MR. SCHEUERMAN: Is the issue as Your Honor sees it
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    at this point in time, correct?
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              THE COURT:
                          Right. Well --
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              MR. SCHEUERMAN: Well, potential issue.
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              THE COURT: I mean, yes, I think that --
              MR. SCHEUERMAN:
                               I don't want to be presumptive.
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              THE COURT: Well, are you conceding that it is
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    defamatory to the company, but is not necessarily defamatory
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    per se?
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              MR. SCHEUERMAN: I don't believe it's defamatory,
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    Your Honor.
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                          Well, right. That is --
              THE COURT:
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              MR. SCHEUERMAN:
                               I really don't. I really don't.
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              But I appreciate your position, your opinion. And I
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    understand that you want me to focus on whether or not it's
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    defamatory per se to the company.
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                          No, actually, I want you to focus on
              THE COURT:
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    your argument, which is you say it is not defamatory unless it
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    attacks what a company does as its primary business.
                                                           That is
25
    your argument.
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MR. SCHEUERMAN: No, not -- defamatory per se. The question is, is it defamatory per se.

THE COURT: Okay. So you are acknowledging that it could be defamatory in terms of attacking the honesty of the company. You are saying that it is not defamatory per se and that only implicates the issue of special damages.

MR. SCHEUERMAN: Well, it's clear you don't want to hear a debate this afternoon on whether or not it's defamatory.

But my -- so my position in light of that is there's an issue whether that could be defamatory per se. Because if not defamatory per se, then the plaintiff has to plead special damages and she has not. It has not. Excuse me.

THE COURT: Okay. Remember, we have a court reporter.

MR. SCHEUERMAN: I apologize.

THE COURT: Yes, I do not want to debate at length anything with you, only because I have not seen any case law.

MR. SCHEUERMAN: Yes.

THE COURT: But I want you to understand that you should, in your written motion, make whatever argument you think is appropriate and legally supportable. If your argument is that there can be no defamation, period, as to a company if the attack is not about the provision of its services, then you should make that argument, obviously. If

that is correct as a matter of law, then you would be able to move, you would be successful in dismissing those claims in the amended complaint. But you are a bit of a moving target on this. I am not sure I understand what your argument is, and maybe because you have not looked at the case law. If you are limiting your argument to you cannot find or it is not enough for defamation per se if you are not attacking the services or if the statements do not relate to the services provided, then make that argument. So I am not telling you not to make an argument if you think you have one. I just have not seen any case law that supports that.

And in the letter written by your partner, the focus was on whether or not the statements that talk about Ms. Levi are really about WatchDog, are really defaming WatchDog, which is a separate issue. And I am telling you on that, I find that the statements on their face are defaming both of them because it references her and it references her business and it references the business trying to put Ms. Gelardi's business out of business, to use that word three times in one sentence, and so I do not think there is any real argument to be made that the allegedly defaming statement is only about Ms. Levi, even though it says she is greedy and ruthless.

MR. SCHEUERMAN: It's difficult to fully brief each issue on a three-page limit, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Understood. Understood.

But, I mean, I think what you are arguing, it strikes me as counterintuitive. But if there is case law supporting it, then you should brief that.

Mr. Kataev, I only cut you off because I do not

think, based on my opinion, there is any real argument to be made that somehow the statements are only about Ms. Levi. That argument, I would reject. It is clear to me on the face of it, especially when you link it to the actual case itself and her Facebook page and the extended discussion that she gets into with one of the repliers or responders or commenters, it is pretty clear that she is defaming both the company and Ms. -- I would say, defaming both the company and Ms. Levi.

MR. KATAEV: For the benefit of my understanding as to the Court's initial comment about my referencing "her" instead of "it," the company, that's mutually exclusive from this; is that right?

THE COURT: Well, I am just noting it as a matter of

MR. KATAEV: Grammar?

THE COURT: Yes. Grammar and carefulness, right?

Because you should not be referencing plaintiff as "she"

because she is not a plaintiff.

MR. KATAEV: I will be more mindful.

THE COURT: Right. That is all.

But, you know, I understand your position that they are interchangeable as a legal matter, but I think that you have to argue based on some facts. Just rhetorically, you will have to be careful about referencing the plaintiff as the company.

MR. KATAEV: Understood.

THE COURT: All right. So 30 days to file your motion.

THE COURTROOM DEPUTY: January 5th, 2023.

THE COURT: And then 30 days to respond.

MR. KATAEV: Generous.

MR. SCHEUERMAN: And no reply, Your Honor?

THE COURTROOM DEPUTY: Response due February 6th.

THE COURT: And then two weeks for the reply.

THE COURTROOM DEPUTY: Reply is due February 20th.

MR. KATAEV: And to assist opposing counsel in making his motion, the opposition papers will include a request for leave to replead if there is a dismissal. I have case law supporting that position.

THE COURT: Well, I mean, let me ask you a question.

Is there something you would do to fend off this motion?

MR. KATAEV: The only thing I could think of,
Your Honor, that might persuade the other side not to move
forward with the motion practice, which anecdotally in
convincing the other side not to do it takes away the argument

that we're aggressively suing in order to raise attorney's fees to put them out of business, is to plead special damages in the event it's found not to be defamation per se as an alternative argument.

THE COURT: Well, can you plead special damages?

MR. KATAEV: I have to investigate that.

THE COURT: Well, if you can, I suggest you do so because it may end up short-circuiting this process.

Especially if it turns out Mr. Scheuerman's argument is that unless the defamatory statements relate to the company's functioning, its basic functioning, you have to plead special damages, then maybe you could, you know, interrupt that process. If you think you can, just let Mr. Scheuerman know so that neither side wastes time briefing it. I am not sure it will necessarily convince Mr. Scheuerman that he does not want to file something, and obviously that is their right, but you might save yourselves money. Your client's money, that is. Okay?

MR. KATAEV: May I propose a deadline of the 19th for me to make that motion to amend or application?

THE COURT: Well, I mean, I guess you can let us know by the 19th of this month.

MR. KATAEV: Yes.

THE COURT: Yes, that is fine. If you want to file something and advise myself and Mr. Scheuerman, that would be

good. Probably more effective, though, is for you to explain to Mr. Scheuerman how you plan to amend.

MR. KATAEV: In advance of that. Yes, of course.

THE COURT: Right. Well, whether they will be satisfied or not. So it is less important to let me know as it is to let the other side know to see if that dissuades them from filing the motion.

MR. KATAEV: Understood.

THE COURT: Whatever happens though, if no motion is filed, then, Mr. Scheuerman, you certainly should let us know on the due date that you are not filing a motion. Okay?

MR. SCHEUERMAN: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Now, the other thing is, I do prefer that the parties do what is called bundling, which means that you, Mr. Scheuerman, would not actually file your motion on the due date, but you would simply serve it on plaintiff, but you would file a letter indicating you had served it, so your cover letter indicating service. And then Mr. Kataev would do the same in terms of the plaintiff's opposition, serve it but not file it, but file the letter indicating service. And then on the last day, final day, which is the reply date, both sides would file their respective pleadings.

The reason I ask you to do this, but I cannot force you to do it, is because it allows me to be more liberal with extensions because the date that you file your motion starts

an internal clock ticking in terms of getting the decision just done. And so obviously once you start that clock ticking, it makes it harder for me to expand the time, especially depending on, you know, how much time you want.

Okay?

So like I said, if you think though, however, you are going to run against some other deadline that is important or filing later would affect something else, you could file it whenever you want to. Again, I cannot force you not to do that. Okay?

MR. SCHEUERMAN: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. So, Mr. Scheuerman, you will enter your appearance through whatever PACER portal you want to.

All right. I look forward to hearing from you, folks. If you can work it out, I think it would be best and maybe just move on with this case, but obviously you have to pursue whatever strategy is most appropriate for your client. Okay?

MR. KATAEV: Judge, I do have one other concern I would like to raise.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. KATAEV: With respect to discovery, currently the deadline for the close of discovery is January 20th. We have not received any documents from the forensic analyst.

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    There is --
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              THE COURT: Yes. I said you should take this up
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    with Judge Cho.
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              MR. KATAEV: Understood.
              THE COURT:
                          Okay. Because I think we ended up
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    extending, maybe, the deadline. But otherwise, if there is
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    some dispute about discovery, take it up with Judge Cho.
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              MR. KATAEV:
                            Including an extension?
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              THE COURT: Yes.
                                Because I think the last order we
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    said was from now on Judge Cho would deal with any extensions.
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              MR. KATAEV: Understood, Your Honor.
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              THE COURT: Yes.
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              MR. SCHEUERMAN: Thank you, Your Honor.
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              THE COURT: Thank you, everyone. Have a good
    holiday.
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              MR. KATAEV: Great to see you, Judge.
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               (Matter concluded.)
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    I certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript from the
    record of proceedings in the above-entitled matter.
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23
        /s/ Andronikh M. Barna
                                           December 18, 2022
          ANDRONIKH M. BARNA
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                                            DATE
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